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The problem that I wish to address can be specified by adverting to Bernard
Lonergan's acknowledgment in his 1973 paper 'Insight Revisited' that significant
developments had taken place in his articulation of the notion of the good between
the publication of Insight and the completion of Method in Theology. There has
been something of a tendency among Lonergan students to see this adrriission as
an indication that in Lonergan's later view chapter 2 of Method should replace
chapter 18 of Insight. No matter what Lonergan's position on this question was, I
wish to suggest that simply replacing the position of Insight with that of Method
would result in a position on the good and on decision that is just as incomplete
as would be the position one would entertain were one to refuse to consider any
account other than the one presented in Insight. My position is that there is a
limited validity to both accounts, and the limit is imposed not by the objective
content of the accounts themselves but by the state of the human subject who
would employ either method in making a decision. 1
My paper has three parts. In the first, I summarize conclusions reached
in earlier work to the effect that the ethics of chapter 18 of Insight presents in
philosophic terms the general form of the method of making decisions that St
Ignatius Loyola calls the 'third time of election,' while the ethics of Method in
Theology presents in philosophic terms the general form of St Ignatius's 'second
time.' Since each 'time' has a limited validity, each of Lonergan's accounts of the
good and of decision would also have its proper justification. This will constitute
my first argument for the abiding significance of the ethics of Insight. A second
1

My interest focuses on the respective noúons of the good in lnsight and Method in Theology and on the
suggested structures of rational self-consciousness (lnsight) or existential responsibility (Method in Theology)
corresponding to these respecúve notions. Recently Patrick Byrne has provided a valuable commentary
on and critique of the argument of chapter 18 of lnsight with which 1 concur, but far from criticizing
the idenúfication of the good with the intelligent and reasonable Byrne's arúcle strengthens Lonergan's
argument in favor of that identificaúon. 1 hope to make a limited contribution in the same direction. See
Patrick Byrne, 'The Goodness of Being in Lonergan's lnsight,' American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
18 (2007) 43-72.
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argument for the continued validity of the approach taken in chapter 18 of
Insíght líes in the fact that the chapter displays the dynamic consciousness that is
employed in the psychological Trinitarian analogy found in Lonergan's work, and
especially in De Deo Trino: Pars systematíca (now available with English facing
pages as volume 12 of Lonergan's Collected Works, The Tríune God: Systematícs).
In fact, this early analogy of Lonergan' s may prove to be of assistance in filling
sorne lacunae in Insíght's account of the dynamic structure of the relation between
knowing and deciding. 2 In the third part, 1 argue that the notion of existential
autonomy presented in The Triune God: Systematics, which relies on and in sorne
ways expands the account of dynamic consciousness that is found in chapter 18
of Insíght, is necessary if Lonergan's intentionality analysis is to be integrated with
René Girard's 'interdividual psychology.' Such an integration is important if 1 am
correct in my view that two of the most important intellectual breakthroughs to
come from Catholic thinkers in the twentieth century - breakthroughs for culture
in general and not simply for the Church- are Lonergan's intentionality analysis
and Girard's mimetic theory. lt is significant that these breakthroughs are both
studies of desire. Integrating them with one another will provide, I believe, a more
complete account of human desire than either of them alone offers. Moreover, the
anticipation of that more complete account will bring our reflections full circle,
returning us to the theme of discernment with which we began, since Lonergan
and Girard together can greatly advance the Catholic tradition's understanding of
what lgnatian language has called the discernment of spirits. The advance is by way
of shifting the articulation of our understanding of discernment from description
to explanation.
Because the first two sections represent summary statements of positions that 1
have articulated more fully in other publications, while the third section presents
the majar field of m y present research and thinking, 1 will devote more attention to
the third section than to the first two.
l. The Ethics of lnsight and St lgnatius Loyola's 'Third !une ofElection'

In this section 1 wish to review and summarize work linking Lonergan' s two
accounts of ethics with St lgnatius Loyola's times of election. More precisely,
because of time constraints 1 will limit these considerations to the connection I
have suggested between chapter 18 of Insíght and the third time of election in the
Spírítual Exercíses of St lgnatius, barely mentioning a similar connection between
chapter 2 of Method in Theology and St lgnatius' s second time of election. 3
2

These lacunae are spotted incisively in Byme' s article mentioned in the previous note.
For the fuller account, see Robert M. Doran, 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan,'
Toronto ]ournal o/ Theology 22:1 (2006) 39-54; 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan:
Revisiting a Topic That Deserves Further Reflection,' Lonergan Workshop 19, ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston
3
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As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Lonergan's acknowledgment in
1973 that significant developments had taken place in bis articulation of the notion
of the good between the publication of Insight and the completion of Method in
Theology has led sorne interpreters to suppose that Lonergan wished to replace the
approach to ethics in Insight with that found in Method. M y position is that there
is a limited validity to both accounts, and the limit is imposed by the state of the
human subject making a decision at a given point in bis or her life.
Because I have gone into a fair amount of detall on this question in other
presentations, I will be very brief here in summarizing m y position. A number of
years ago it occurred to me that there might be sorne correspondence between
Lonergan's two accounts of the human good and of decision and St Ignatius
Loyola's times of election, as proposed in bis .Spiritual Exercises. I first suggested
these connections in Theology and the Dialectics o/ History, 4 and have developed
them considerably in the past few years. St Ignatius proposes in the Exercises three
times for making a 'sound and good election.'5 Each of these 'times' is really a
mode of proceeding, and in each case the mode of proceeding depends on the
interior state in which one finds oneself when one is faced with having to make a
decision. The three modes of proceeding are all valid, but only one of them will be
proper or useful at a given time, and what determines the mode one will employ
is precisely the interior conditions in which one finds oneself: in Heidegger' s term,
one's Befindlichkeit. 6 The first time is exemplified in St Paul and St Matthew, who
were so moved that there was no possibility of doubt as to what they were to
do. The second time calls for the discernment of the pulls and counterpulls of
affectivity, in the reading of consolations and desolations. In the third time, one is
tranquil, and sois free to employ one' s intelligence, rationality, and moral existential
responsibility, one's 'natural powers,' freely and quietly.
The three times are exhaustive. Either God has so moved one that there are no
further questions, or this has not happened. If it has not happened, either one is
pulled in various directions affectively, or one is not. If one is, one is in St Ignatius's
College, 2006) 83 -106; 'Discernment and Lonergan's Fourth Level of Consciousness,' Gregorianum 89:4
(2008) 790-802.
4
Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics o/ History (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990,
2001) 57-58,87-88 .
.5 Spiritual Exercises o/ St. Ignatius Loyola, trans. Henry Keane, S.J. (London: Burns Oates and
Washbourne, 1952) 61.
6
Martín Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper
& Row, 1962) index, 'state-of-mind.' A former student of mind, Ravi Michael Louis, S.]., has argued that
the basic Sorge is really discernment. This argument appeared in an unpublished paper that he wrote for a
course that 1 taught, 'The Christian lmagination: Sorne Operative Symbols.' This connects with my use in
Theology and the Dialectics o/ History of Eric Voegelin' s phrase 'the search for direction in the movement
of life.' See Eric Voegelin, 'The Gospel and Culture,' in ]esus and Man's Hope, ed. Donald G. Miller and
Dikran Y. Hadidian, vol. 2 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, 1971) passim.
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second time, and one relies on the various suggestions provided for discerning the
pulls and counterpulls of affective inclinations in order to determine where they
lead and whether they lead to what is truly or only apparently good. If one is not,
one is in St Ignatius's third time, and relies on one's native powers of intelligence
and reason and on the inner demand for consistency between what one knows and
what one does.
That St Ignatius's third time corresponds to Insight's account of the good and
of decision is confirmed by the two methods the Saint propases for making an
election in the third time. F or each of them is a matter of being 'intelligent and
reasonable,' which is exactly how Lonergan describes the good as it is presented
in Insight. 7 In the first method, one weighs, in the light of the service of God, the
advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives, precisely to see 'to which side
reason most inclines.' 8 And in the second, one imagines oneself counseling another
on the same issues and asks oneself what one would advise the other to do, or one
imagines oneself at the point of death or at the day of judgment, and then one asks
oneself what one would wish one had done. In either case, one's decision flows
from reasonable judgment based on a grasp of evidence. In the language of Insight,
'the value is the good as the possible object of rational choice.' 9
1 note here especially Lonergan's use of the word 'value,' for while there is no
mention ofjudgments of value in Insight except in the discussion ofbelief in chapter
20, still there is in Insight a notion of value. Section 1.3 of chapter 18 is entitled 'The
Notion of Value,' and it is clear in reading that section that the phrase means 'the
dynamic exigence of rational consciousness for self-consistency' between knowing
and doing. 10 This is precisely the exigence that governs St lgnatius's 'third time
of election.' One questions 'to which side reason most inclines,' and once that
question has been answered, one experiences a moral exigence to act accordingly.
The question, To which side does reason most incline? is answered in what Lonergan
in Insight calls 'the practica! insight' (section 2.3) and 'practica! reflection' (section
2.4), both of which lead to a judgment concerning the reasonable possibility of a
certain course of action. The judgment is not called a judgment of value or even
a practica! judgment, but simply a judgment. 11 lt is such considerations as these
7

'In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable.' Bernard Lonergan, 'lnsight Revited,' in A
Second Collection, ed. William F.J Ryan, S.J., and BernardJ. Tyrrell, S.J. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996) 277. Byrne's article refers to the list of questions that Lonergan suggests the subject might ask,
questions that complement those suggested by St lgnatius in his presentation of the third time.
8
Spiritual Exercises 63.
9
Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study o/ Human Understanding, vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992)
624.
10
Ibid., 625.
11
There is a fascinating study waiting to be made of the development of Lonergan's thought on
judgments of value. I do not think that the position on judgments of value that is expressed in Method in
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that have led meto suggest that chapter 18 of Insight be regarded as presenting in
philosophical terms the general form of St Ignatius's third time of election. And if
that is correct, then we have a first argument for the permanent validity of Insight's
account of the good and of human decision. 12 ·
2. The Ethics of Insight and the Psychological Analogy

My second argument for the permanent validity of the ethical position presented
in Insight appeals to the role that this position plays in establishing the contours
of the psychological analogy for the Trinitarian processions presented in The
Triune God: Systematics, that is, in Lonergan's two Latín treatises in Trinitarian
systematics, Divinarum personarum and De Deo Trino: Pars systematica. More
precisely, Lonergan's two accounts of decision provide, respectively, the elements
of two distinct but complementary approaches to a psychological analogy for a
systematic understanding of T rinitarian processions and relations. But again, time
constraints do not permit meto go into detall on the correlation between Method's
account of decision and Lonergan' s later articulation of the psychological analogy. 13
In the first psychological analogy found in Lonergan's work, which is the
Theology emerged until about 1967. The expression occurs earlier, of course, but either in the context of
the discussion of belief, where one makes 'a judgment on the value of deciding to believe with certitude
or with probability that sorne proposition certainly or probably is true or false' (Insight 730), oras a term
to describe the same judgment that is spoken of simply as a judgment in chapter 18 of Insight. There is an
evolution of the latter usage from the 'iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris' of Divinarum personarum
conceptio analogica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1957, 1959) to the simple 'iudicium valoris' of De
Deo Trino: Pars systematica (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964). See Bernard Lonergan, The Triune
God: Systematics, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2007) 181. See also Byrne, 'The Goodness of Being in Lonergan's Insight'
59-60.
12
A related issue concerns the so-called 'fourth level of consciousness.' It is well known that there is
no explicit mention of a fourth level in Insight. If in fact the account of decision in Instght does imply the
affirmation of a fourth level, that level would consist only of the further element of free choice that Insight
adds to the cognitional process of experience, understanding, and judgment. The mode of proceeding
that is suggested in Method in Theology, which I suggest presents in philosophical terms the general form
of St Ignatius's second time of election, entails a far more fulsome fourth level, which emerges when and
only when one is proceeding according to this mode. The fourth level would include everything from the
apprehension of possible values in feelings, through the discernment of these feelings and the judgment of
value that concludes the process of discernment, to the decision itself. There remains the further question,
however, which I raised in a recent article, asto whether we must dispense with 'level' language entirely
and simply talk about sublating and sublated operations and states. See Robert M. Doran, 'Addressing the
Four-point Hypothesis,' Theological Studies 68 (2007) 680. I believe too much ink has been spilled over the
question of how many levels there are; the spatial metaphor is interfering with the real question of sublating
and sublated operations and states.
13
For more on this question, see Doran, 'Ignatian Themes in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan:
Revisiting a Topic That Deserves Further Reflection' 96-99. See also Robert M. Doran, 'Being in Love with
God: A Source of Analogies for Theological Understanding,' Irish Theological Quarterly 7Y{2008) 227-

e.
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analogy that he has developed most fully, the analogue in the creature is found
in those moments of existential self-constitution in which the subject grasps the
sufficiency of evidence regarding what it would be good for one to be, utters
the judgment of value, 'This is good,' and proceeds to decisions commensurate
with that grasp of evidence and judgment of value. The analogy is in the order of
existential self-constitution or of what in The Triune God: Systematics Lonergan
calls 'existential autonomy.' We will investigate the notion of autonomy more in
the next section. lt is sufficient at present to acknowledge that, from the act of
grasping the evidence, there proceeds the act of judging value, and from the two
acts together there proceeds the love that embraces the good and carries it out.
This is precisely the account of decision presented in lnsight, even if the wording
is different. The analogy consists in the fact that in divine self-constitution, from
the Father's grasp of the grounds for affirming the goodness of all that the Father
is and knows, there proceeds the eterna! Word of the Father saying Y esto it all,
a Word that is a judgment of value, 14 and from the F ather and the W ord together
there proceeds the eterna! Love that is the Holy Spirit. This theology of God's
own self-constitution in knowledge, word, and love is informed by an analogy
with human rational self-consciousness as Lonergan has understood the latter in
lnsight. One's self-appropriation of one's rational self-consciousness in the form in
which it is presented in lnsight, or again as it functions in a commonsense mode in
St Ignatius's presentation of the 'third time' of election, thus entails the recognition
that those processes, those processions, that mode of making a decision, constitute
an image of the Trinitarian processions themselves.
While 1 cannot here go into detall regarding Lonergan' s second articulation of
the psychological analogy, 15 the analogy is that, as moral integrity in the account in
Method is a function of generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love
in an unqualified way, andas those judgments of value are carried out in decisions
that are acts of loving, so the Father is infinite and eterna! being-in-love, an agape
that generates a Word, the eterna! Yes that is the Son, a Word that breathes love,
a Yes that grounds the Proceeding Love that is breathed forth as from agape and
from its manifestation in such a Word. While the being-in-love that provides the
starting point of the analogy may be any of the three variants of love that Lonergan
14

See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics 181.
n The principal difference is in the starting point of the analogy. 'The psychological analogy [ ... ]
has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that
is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the
judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.
'Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named ho Theos, who is idenúfied with
agape (1 John 4:8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its verbum spirans amorem, which
is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is
identified with the Holy Spirit.' Bernard Lonergan, 'Christology Today: Methodological Considerations,'
in A Third Collection , ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985) 93.
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acknowledges- love in the family, lave in the community, and the unrestricted
being-in-love that is sanctifying grace- the possibility is open for an analogy in
the arder of grace itself. The dynamic state of being in lave in an unqualified way
is what theology has traditionally called sanctifying grace, and Lonergan speaks of
sanctifying grace as a created participation in and imitation of the active spiration
of Father and Word lovingly breathing the Holy Spirit, while the habit of charity
that flows from sanctifying grace is a created participation in and imitation of the
passive spiration, the divine Proceeding Love, that is the Holy Spirit. This is one
way of understanding the relation of gratia operans and gratia cooperans in the
arder of habitual grace.
1 have argued that it may be quite fruitful in many ways for us to pursue this
possibility and to detail as precisely as we can the processions of act from act that
would constitute emanatio intelligibilis in the arder of grace. 16 However, Lonergan
is very clear in his agreement with the First Vatican Council that appropriate
theological analogies are from what is naturally known, and so while there may
be analogies within the supernatural arder of the mysteries themselves, and while
it may be fruitful in the contemporary theological scene to stress these analogies
- 1 am thinking here especially of furthering the possibilities between students of
Lonergan and those of Hans Urs von Balthasar- still even these must be derived
from the analogy with naturally known realities. Here is where the first psychological
analogy in Lonergan' s work shows its permanent significance. lf there are indeed
processions of act from act in the supernatural order, these can nevertheless be
understood only by analogy with processions of act from act in human intelligent,
rational, and moral consciousness. The argument can be made that nowhere in the
theologicalliterature is there a clearer articulation of what precise!y is meant by the
emanatio intelligibilis that constitutes the psychological analogy than in Lonergan's
work. The most significant aspect of that claim for my present purpose is that it is
precisely the account of decision presented in Insight that provides Lonergan's first
psychological analogy from what is naturally known.
This constitutes a second, theological argument for the permanent validity of
chapter 18 of Insight.
3. Existential Autonomy and lnterdividuality

1 begin this section with a statement of psychiatrist Jean-Michel Oughourlian,
in the dialogical encounter with René Girard published as Things Hzdden since the
Foundation o/ the World: '[ ... ] the real human subject can only come out of the rule

16
See Robert M. Doran, 'Being in Love with God: A Source of Analogies for Theological
Understanding.'
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of the Kingdom; apart from this rule, there is never anything but mimetism and
the "interdividual." Until this happens, the only subject is the mimetic structure.' 17
The phrase 'the mimetic structure' refers to the account of acquisitive desire
that Girard has been exposing for severa! decades, in various works of literary
criticism, anthropology, psychology, and theological reflection. Very briefly,
many of our desires are neither as spontaneous nor as autonomous as we like to
believe, but originate rather in the desire of another whom we take as a model or
mediator of our own desire. When the desire is acquisitive, that is, when I want
what you have or want because you have or want it, the other becomes the rival,
and attention is gradually removed from the object of the respective desires to
focus more or less exclusive!y on the rivalry between the model and the imitator.
Acquisitive mimesis has become conflictual mimesis, and conflictual mimesis is
contagious within a community, leading eventually to the selection of an arbitrary
victim or scapegoat, whose immolation, exclusion, or marginalization from the
community restares peace at least temporarily and avoids the danger of escalating
violence in the community.
One possible initial heuristic structure for integrating the respective studies of
human desire composed by Bernard Lonergan and René Girard may be specified by
reference toa quotation from The Triune God: Systematics: '[. .. ] we are conscious
in two ways: in one way, through our sensibility, we undergo rather passively what
we sense and imagine, our desires and fears, our delights and sorrows, our joys and
sadness; in another way, through o.u r intellectuality, we are more active when we
consciously inquire in arder to understand, understand in arder to utter a word,
weigh evidence in arder to judge, deliberate in arder to choose, and exercise our
will in arder to act.' 18
The first way of being conscious is sensitive or psychic; the second is intelligent,
reasonable, and responsible. Both ways ofbeing conscious are also ways of desiring.
The first entails a preponderance of 'undergoing,' while the second, though it surely
involves passivity- 'intelligere est quoddam pati,' Lonergan repeats from Aquinas 19
- stresses as well and indeed highlights the self-governed and self-possessed
unfolding of operations that is indicated by Lonergan's repetition of the phrase 'in
arder to ... ' The first way appears more spontaneous, though if the 'undergoing' is
interdividual this may be an illusion. The second shows greater autonomy, but only
if it manifests what Oughourlian calls 'the real human subject,' the subject that has
transcended the influence of the mimetic, however precariously. Por the two ways
17

Jean-Michel Oughourlian, in René Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation o/the World (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) 199, emphasis in the text. Girard's response (ibid.): 'That is quite
right.'
18
Lonergan, Th e Triune God: Systematics 139.
19
Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas 142, quoting Thomas Aquinas, Super I Sententiarum ,
d. 8, q. 3, a. 2 sol, who himself is quoting Aristotle, De anima , III, 4, 429a 13-15.
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of being conscious interact, and the relative autonomy of the second way may be
compromised by the gradual infiltration of mimetic desire into the performance
of spiritual operations. A clear instance of how this may happen is illustrated by
expanding on a comment in Max Scheler' s essay on ressentiment, an essay which
may justly be interpreted, I believe, as foreshadowing Girard's work, in that Girard
adds the crucial piece regarding mimesis. Scheler writes,
Beyond all conscious lying and falsifying, there is a deeper 'organic mendacity.'
Here the falsification is not formed in consciousness but at the same stage
of the mental process as the impressions and value feelings themselves: on the
road of experience into consciousness. There is 'organic mendacity' whenever a
man' s mind admits only those impressions and feelings which serve his 'interest'
or his instinctive attitude. Already in the process of mental reproduction and
recollection, the contents of his experience are modified in this direction. He who
is 'mendacious' has no need to líe! In his case, the automatic process of forming
recollections, impressions, and feelings is involuntarily slanted, so that conscious
falsification becomes unnecessary. 20
The expansion on this comment that I have in mind would stress that the very
processions of act from act at the levels of intelligence, reason, and decision - the
emergence of a word from insight, the emanation of a judgment from reflective
grasp, the procession of a decision from the preceding acts- have already been
derailed by an earlier distortion that reaches into the organic interdividuality of the
less than 'real human subject' and occasions a deviation in the emergence of act
from the potentiality of underlying manifolds all along the line. The distortion of
the emergence of act from potency gives rise to a distortion also in the emergence
of act from act. 21
The first way ofbeing conscious and of desiring is more (though not exclusively)
characterized by the emergence of act from potency, and the second more (though
not exclusively) by the emergence of act from act, by emanatio intelligibilis,
intelligible emanation or what I prefer to call autonomous spiritual procession.
Girard specializes in clarifying the first of these ways ofbeing conscious, emphasizing
its intersubjective or 'interdividual' character, while Lonergan has explored the
second perhaps more acutely and thoroughly (to say nothing of more accurately)
than any other thinker.
Precisely because of the interplay between these two dimensions of interiority
and desire, Girard regards .as illusory most of our attempts to describe our acts,
including our intentional operations, as either spontaneous or autonomous.
In the first book-length presentation of his theory of mimetic desire, Mensonge
20

Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,
1961) 77-78.
21
Questions raised by Fred Lawrence prompted this articulation, which needs further development.
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romantique et vérité romanesque, translated into English as Deceit) Desire and
the Novel, he speaks of the illusion that our desires are spontaneous inclinations
toward attractive objects. 22 But the same illusion is spoken of there as the 'illusion
of autonomy.' 23 Asan illusion of spontaneity, the desire is imagined to be 'deeply
rooted in the object and in this object alone.' 24 As an illusion of autonomy, it is
thought to be 'rooted in the subject.' In fact the two delineations of the illusion
cover over the same fact, namely, that the desire has been mediated by another and
is contaminated by mimetic contagian.
In a recent paper delivered at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, I
proposed sorne considerations to enable us to make our way through these complex
relations. 1 will repeat these suggestions here in summary fashion.
First, Lonergan speaks of the need for a fourfold differentiation of consciousness
required if we are to replace classicism with an acceptable Weltanschauung
for our time, in which 'the workings of common sense, science, scholarship,
intentionality analysis, and the life of prayer have been integrated. ' 25 But as 1 have
attempted to argue from the beginning of my own work, 'intentionality analysis'
is one dimension of 'interiority analysis,' but not the only one. There is also the
sensitive-psychological dimension, the conjugate intelligibilities that, if Girard
is correct, reside largely in the intersubjective roots of Lonergan's first 'way of
being conscious.' But in this context the word 'autonomy' can take on an added
significance, beyond the salutary hermeneutic of suspicion that Girard exercises
with regard to our illusions. There is a ·discussion of existential autonomy that
appears in Lonergan's presentation of his analogy for the Trinitarian processions,
and again it is rooted in the rationalexigence for self-consistency between knowing
and doing that constitutes the notion of value in the ethics of Insight.
Lonergan reaches a clear specification of the proper Trinitarian analogy through
a series of disjunctions. The disjunctions, he says, will provide a set of criteria by
which we may discern whether any given analogy is appropriate or not. The first
six of these disjunctions may be treated vet;y briefly.
In the first disjunction Lonergan establishes that we must move from the
appropriation of sorne concrete mode of procession in human consciousness,
rather than from an abstract definition of procession; in the second that any
knowledge of divine procession must be analogical; in the third that the analogy
must be systematic, that is, capable of resolving every other theoretical question in
22
René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Sel/ and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976) 12.
23
!bid., 16.
24
Ibid., 12.
2
~ Bernard Lonergan, 'Doctrinal Pluralism,' in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol. 17
in Collected Works ofBernard Lonergan , ed. Robert C. Croken and RobertM. Doran (Toronto: University
ofToronto Press, 2004).
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Trinitarian theology; in the fourth that the analogy must be from what is naturally
known; the fifth establishes that it must be from a specific nature, not from
metaphysical common notions as in natural theology; and the sixth that that nature
must be spiritual.
The seventh disjunction brings us closer to the notion of autonomy. The seventh
disjunction is between those spiritual processions in which act proceeds from
potency and those in which act proceeds from act. Since in God there is only act,
only the latter processions in human consciousness will provide an appropriate
analogy. 'The analogy [ ... ] must be selected from the conscious originating of a
real, natural, and conscious act, from a real, natural, and conscious act, within
intellectual consciousness itself and by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself. '26
Such are the procession of conceptual syntheses from direct understanding, the
procession of judgments of fact and of value from the grasp of sufficient grounds,
and the procession of decisions from reflective grasp and the inner word of
judgment that follows upon it.
The eighth disjunction is between an appropriation of the dynamics of intellectual
consciousness and a more distant metaphysical statement of cognitional fact. Only
appropriation can enable us to distinguish the autonomous intellectual procession
of act from act under the power of transcendental laws from the spontaneous
intellectual procession of act from potency and from the spontaneous sensitive
processions of act from both potency and act in accord with the laws specific to
continuations of prehuman processes such as those manifested in primordial human
intersubjectivity. Note that Lonergan has here introduced bis own meaning for the
words 'spontaneous' and 'autonomous.' By 'autonomous intellectual procession
of act from act' he is referring to a consciousness that is under rule or law only
inasmuch as it is constituted by its own transcendental desire, to which there are
attached what he carne to call the transcendental precepts. But by fidelity to these
precepts such a consciousness 'rules itself inasmuch as under God's agency it
determines itself to its own acts in accordance with the exigencies' of intelligence,
rationality, and existential responsibility. 27
This, I propose, is the autonomy of what Oughourlian called the 'real human
subject.' It does proceed from an intellectual spontaneity, namely, the conscious
transcendental notion of being that is the native desire to know and the conscious
transcendental notion of value that extends that native desire by force of a further
question, a question in the existential arder. But that spontaneity becomes
preceptive, and this is what converts the spontaneity into a genuine autonomy:
not only do we raise questions, we must raise them; not only do we doubt, we must
doubt; not only do we deliberate, we must deliberate. We must niise questions lest
26
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we pass judgment on what we do not understand; we must raise doubts lest we
adhere to a false appearance of truth; we must deliberate lest we rush headlong to
our own destruction. 28 And it is in fidelity to the must, to the exigency into which the
spontaneity has been transformed, that there emerges the only genuine autonomy
of which the human subject is capable. That autonomy governs only sorne of the
processions that occur in intelligent, rational, responsible consciousness, those
processions in which act proceeds not from potency but from act. Such is the case
with the autonomy of freedom whenever we choose because we ourselves judge
and because our choice is in accordance with our judgment; such is the case with
the autonomy of rationality whenever we judge because we grasp the evidence and
because our judgment is in accord with the grasped evidence; such is the case with
the autonomy of clarity whenever we define because we grasp the intelligible in the
sensible and because our definition is in accord with grasped intelligibility. 29 And
it is only in the procession of act from act, and not in the procession of act from
potency as in the emergence of insight from questions, that the proper analogy is
found for understanding, however remotely, the Trinitarian processions: 'as is the
case when a word arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the act of
understanding, and a choice arises by virtue of consciousness as determined by the
act of judgment (that is, by a compound word).' 30
The ninth disjunction is tripartite, for such autonomy can be manifested in the
realm of practica! intelligence and rationality, in the realm of speculative intelligence
and rationality, and in the realm of existential self-determination through rational
judgment and responsible choice. 'When one asks about the triune God, one is not
considering God as creator or as agent, and so one is prescinding from practica!
autonomy. Nor is one considering God insofar as God understands and judges
and loves all things, and so one is prescinding from speculative matters. But one
is considering God inasmuch as God is in himself eternally constituted as triune,
and so one takes one' s analogy from the processions that are in accordance with the
exercise of existential autonomy,' the autonomy in which one decides to operate
in accord with the norms inherent in the unfolding of attentiveness, intelligence,
rationality, and moral responsibility. 31 That alone is the genuine autonomy of the
'real human subject,' and while it is an autonomy that has transcended the mimetic
structure of the interdividual and thus emerged into genuine subjectivity, it has not
transcended every form of subordination or of imitation. Rather, 'the autonomy of
human consciousness is indeed subordinate, not to every object whatsoever [and,
we must add, not to every mimetic structure whatsoever], but to the infinite subject
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in whose image it has been made and whom it is bound to imitate.' 32 Even more
precise!y, of course, we must emphasize that the autonomy of human consciousness
has been made in the image and likeness not of one but of three infinite subjects
of the one divine consciousness, and its genuine autonomy consists precisely in
its fidelity to that image, issuing a word because it has understood something and
moving to loving decision because that decision is in accord with the true value
judgnient that is its verbum spirans amorem. In such fidelity there is imitation, but
it is the imitation built into the image of the triune God, the imitation of the divine
relations themselves.
In the final analysis, then, the abiding significance of the ethics of Insight is found
in the fact that it is a clear articulation of precise! y what constitutes the imitation of
the Trinitarian relations that constitute us even in our human nature as images of
God. By fidelity to the transcendental precepts, we move from mimetic contagian
to an imitation of God that converts the deviated transcendence of mimetic rivalry
and its false religion into the genuine transcendence of being in love with God.
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